However, the use of the FCA as it currently stands raises many policy problems, especially when applied to cases involving chemical and physical restraints. This article will examine the history and elements of the FCA and how it has been applied in the health care context. It will also analyze the benefits and drawbacks of using the FCA in health care cases, and determine how a court would decide a case based on the use of restraints. It will argue that, for a number of policy and procedural reasons, the FCA should not be extended to cover cases involving chemical and physical restraints. Finally, it will explore possible solutions to the policy problems raised by the Act and alternative means of obtaining justice.
HISTORY OF THE FCA Known originally as "Lincoln's Law," the FCA was enacted in 1863 to deter and punish those who submitted false bills to the government for supplies never sent to Union troops and for overbilling of supplies actually sent.
8 "For sugar it often got sand; for coffee, rye; for leather, something no better than brown paper; [and] for sound horses and mules, spavined beasts and dying donkeys. . . ." 9 The original statute contained a qui tam provision to encourage private individuals, known as relators, to report alleged fraud to the government with the possibility of earning a reward in the form of a portion of the government's winnings, usually around 15%. 10 When a relator brings a qui tam action, the government is given sixty days to decide whether REV. 455, 459-60 (1998) .
15. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1467 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing S. REP. NO. 345, at 2-4 (1986) , reprinted in 1986 U.S.C. C.A.N. 5266, 5267-69 19. United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1997 ).
it will intervene in the case and take over as the prosecution.
11
If the government does not intervene, the relator can still pursue a suit under the FCA.
12 However, if the government decides to enter the suit, the "relator's direct involvement with the case virtually ceases." 13 Most early amendments to the FCA were unfriendly to the relator, and as a result, few qui tam actions were brought until the 1980s.
14 The FCA was amended in 1986 to expand its scope, due to concerns over "rising government fraud, especially in the areas of defense contracting and health care benefits."
15 These amendments were designed to encourage qui tam relators by increasing the relator's share of winnings to 25%-30% and enhance their ability to bring and assist in cases by lowering the burden of proof, increasing the penalties, and allowing a relator to stay in a suit even when the government intervened.
ELEMENTS OF THE FCA
A FCA claim such as the cases against CMMC is brought under section (a)(1) of the FCA, which imposes liability on a person who "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty. . . ."
17 Courts have interpreted this section as five discrete elements: "(1) A claim (2) submitted to the U.S. government (3) which is false or fraudulent (4) with sufficient knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of the claim (5) constituting a negative and direct effect on the federal treasury."
18
A claim submitted to the U.S. government under the Medicare statute has been interpreted as a single submission form. rule or regulation and submits a number of bills with the same mistake for reimbursement, each bill will be subjected to a separate penalty.
20
The penalties are assessed as a set amount for each false claim (ranging from $5,500 to $11,000), plus three times the amount of damages to the government. 21 However, a bill will only be subject to penalty if it is found to be false. Case law holds that falsity of a claim implies an attempt to deceive. 22 However, the choice of bad methodologies may cross the line and render the providers' claim false. 23 Falsity in the health care context is most easily found where a bill for services not performed is submitted. Obviously, the nonperformance of a service constitutes a false claim for reimbursement when the bill is presented to the government. However, falsity has also been found based on a theory of supplying worthless or substandard products.
24
To prove the products and care provided is substandard, the proponent of the false claim must show that the product or care was not worth the amount billed to Medicare. 25 In proving this, a proponent will rely on the standards set forth in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, applicable to nursing homes under the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA), or the Conditions of Participation of the Medicare statute applicable to hospitals. 26 To participate in Medicare, all providers must submit applications stating that services were performed as billed and sign off on a clause recognizing that any misrepresentations will make the provider liable under the Medicare statute.
27
In United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, the Court found that by submitting bills, providers implicitly certify to the government that they are abiding by applicable statutes, rules, and regulations requiring the provision of appropriate quality of care and safety. 28 Knowledge under the FCA includes actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance of the truth, and reckless disregard of the truth.
33
Reckless disregard of the truth has been interpreted as an extension of, and closely related to, gross negligence. 34 The proponent of a suit under the FCA is not required to prove specific intent. 35 By submitting a claim to Medicare, a provider is imputed with knowledge of all rules and regulations associated with making claims, and therefore has "few defenses to the knowledge requirement."
36 Whether the knowledge of the amount and type of care given can be imputed to the provider is a difficult question. In NHC Health Care Corp., the Court held that knowledge of substandard care can be imputed if a jury could find the nursing homes did not have a sufficient staff to properly care for residents under the terms of its Medicare agreement. 37 The Court maintained that the FCA "allows a jury to find knowledge based on deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for the truth," and acknowledged that this conclusion could be inferred from evidence of shortages in the staff and the neglect of the residents. 38 The Court subsequently held:
an entity who is charging the Government for a minimum amount of care provided to its residents should question whether understaffing might lead to undercare. The knowledge of the answer to that question is charged to the Defendants when they submitted their Medicare and Medicaid claim forms. In other words, a jury could reasonably find that NHC should have known if they were failing to provide all necessary care . . . at the time they submitted their claims for reimbursement.
39
In a physical and chemical restraint case under the FCA, the government (or the relator) must prove all five elements of a FCA case. The proponent of the suit must show that the provider submitted a claim for reimbursement to the government. 40 The proponent of the suit will also have to prove that the claim is false, typically by showing that the use of restraints by the provider was not in compliance with the NHRA or the Conditions of Participation.
41
The knowledge element is usually easy to prove, as most providers who receive reimbursements from Medicare are imputed with the knowledge of the statute, rules, and regulations.
42 However, the proponent will have to prove that the provider knew or should have known about the abuse of restraints.
43
Since an abuse of restraints would mean that the government is paying for a higher quality of care than the patient is receiving, a negative effect on the federal treasury can be implied.
PENALTIES
Under the FCA, each false claim is fined between $5,000 and $10,000-the exact amount is left to the judge's discretion-plus three times the amount of damages that the government sustains due to the false claim. 44 However, in 1999, the DOJ issued a final rule that the initial fine is increased to $5,500 to $11,000 for each false claim made to the government. 45 While in many health care claims the actual damage to the government may be pennies, an initial penalty of at least $5,000 per claim filed means that the fine to the provider can be astronomical.
46
Since the Medicare statute has its own liability provision, a provider can also be liable and subject to a separate penalty under provisions in the Medicare statute for a false claim for reimbursement.
THE FCA AS APPLIED TO HEALTH CARE CASES
Since the 1980s, the FCA has been used by imaginative federal prosecutors to punish and deter a wide array of crimes, including health care fraud. 48 One of the first successful substandard care suits by the federal government was United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Centers of Oklahoma, Inc., in which the DOJ brought a FCA action against a psychiatric hospital. 49 The government alleged that "appropriate precautions were not taken and that physical injury to and sexual abuse of patients occurred because of inadequate conditions, such as understaffed shifts, lack of monitoring equipment, and inappropriate housing assignments." 50 Therefore, the government maintained that the failure of the defendant to provide a safe and quality environment violated the FCA. 51 This violation of the FCA rested on the facility's implied certification that the billings presented to the government complied with the Medicaid statutes and regulations in submitting bills under the program. 52 The court agreed with the government and found that defendant violated the FCA by submitting bills for procedures that were not performed to the standard of care set forth in the Medicare statute.
53
Reasoning similar to Aranda was applied in a consent decree between the DOJ and GMS Management-Tucker, Inc. for care given in the Tucker House Nursing Home.
54
The U.S. government filed a complaint against GMS Management-Tucker, Inc. due to reports of poor wound care and malnutrition at the Tucker Home under the theory that the care given was below the standard set in the NHRA. 55 The allegations of false claims arose from the accounts of three patients in the home who all lost extreme amounts of weight and developed severe decubitus ulcers (bedsores). 56 The NHRA requires nursing homes that receive Medicare payments to abide by standards such as maintaining or enhancing the quality of life of residents, providing adequate nutrition and wound care, and providing for the physical and psychological well-being of residents. 57 The theory advanced by the government was that the nursing home signed off on an agreement with the government certifying that the care provided comported with the bills submitted. 58 The government alleged when the nursing home sought reimbursement for services that did not meet the statutory standard of care, it was submitting claims in violation of the FCA. 59 In February of 1996, the owners and operators of the nursing home agreed to a $600,000 penalty to settle the claim and entered into a consent order that mandated monitoring and reporting by all facilities owned by GMSTucker.
60
In the CMMC case, the government utilized the same theory of liability as earlier cases to address the use of chemical and physical restraints. 61 The government relied on the implied certification theory, maintaining that the medical center agreed to abide by the Conditions of Participation of the Medicare statute when it submitted bills for reimbursement. 64 Since the qui tam amendments of 1986, the government has been able to recoup almost $8 billion.
65
Proponents of the use of the FCA against providers also claim that the ability for individuals with any information on possible FCA violations to bring suit against a provider facilitates the government's capacity to address problems. 66 Under the qui tam provision, anyone who possesses original inside information has standing to bring suit against the provider.
67 Since many of the victims of the substandard care are unable to bring suit due to logistical or competency concerns, the qui tam provision allows friends or family of the victim, or staff of the hospital or nursing home to bring suit. Therefore, the FCA allows individuals who are not the victims themselves to address standard of care violations.
Along with allowing non-victims of substandard care to bring suit, the FCA allows suits to be brought in situations where state law actions would fail. For example, under state tort law claims, the individual bringing suit must be able to prove at least negligence on the part of the provider in order to win. 68 Proving negligence may be challenging because of the requirement of demonstrating proximate causation. substandard care led to the harm to the victim by way of the victim's testimony is difficult. Also, many times the victim is not in a condition where he or she would be able to bring suit. Many victims do not have access to outside assistance, nor do they have the requisite mental capacity to bring a suit alone. 69 Under the FCA, the relator, and not the victim, must only show that the care given was not up to par with the relevant statute.
Furthermore, the high penalties that are mandated by the FCA serve as a strong deterrent to hospitals and nursing homes. Under the theory of deterrence, a provider will be sure that it is following the standards set out in federal statute to avoid the enormous penalties under the Act. As stated by Assistant U.S. attorney David Hoffman, "the use of the False Claims Act is another weapon available to the government to combat inappropriate behavior, and it will be pointed at those who choose profits over good care. . . ." 70 Therefore, the use of the FCA may also encourage nursing homes and hospitals to provide quality care to avoid the threat of penalties.
Proponents of using the FCA against health care providers point to examples such as the one from Chippenham Manor Nursing Home, a large nursing home located in Richmond, Virginia. The home was threatened with FCA action due to its alleged substandard care, including patients with "spontaneous skin breakdowns," and staffing and supplies shortages.
71
Shortly after the threat, the home settled with the government.
72
In the settlement, the home agreed to pay $275,000 to the government. However, instead of the money going into the Medicare trust as it has with other cases, the bulk of the money was put toward an approved "restorative plan" to fix the problems. 73 During informal interviews, both residents and staff of the facility agree that Chippenham has improved since the settlement. However, this type of recycling of fines, namely, the use of the settlement money to fund the improvement of the provider, is exceedingly rare. A number of problems arise when the FCA is used as a sword against health care providers. The most glaring are the practical problems of the astronomical fines imposed by the FCA on providers who are already struggling to stay afloat, and the strong incentives placed on provider to give up their cases and settle. Furthermore, the NHRA and the Conditions of Participation are written in aspirational legislative language that does not translate well to real-world practice. Apart from the practical problems, a number of theoretical problems also emerge when the FCA is taken out of its original context.
The most obvious problem with using the FCA as a punishment to nursing homes and hospitals that are allegedly falling under the appropriate standard of care is that the fines imposed upon the providers can be ruinous. For most providers, operating on razor-thin profit or, in the case of many community hospitals, no profit, the imposition of the penalties will gravely affect their ability to continue to care for their patients.
75
Many of the providers who are subject to FCA action are "dependant on federal funding . . . [and] face the Herculean task of improving quality of care and strictly complying with burdensome regulations, all while government reimbursement rates are diminishing." 76 The enormous FCA penalties have the potential to shut down facilities. "While closing the doors of a facility providing 'inferior' services is beneficial to the residents, bankrupting the facilities and the consequential damage that could occur from transferring the residents may not be the appropriate ends to justify the means." 77 In Northern Health Facilities, Inc. v. United States, the court held that the risk of "'transfer trauma' resulting in severe psychological, emotional, and physical damage due to this closure" to the residents of the facility was substantial and should be a weighty consideration when a facility closure may occur. FCA litigation and penalties, even if they do not force a facility to close, may threaten the adequacy of resources available to the facility to dedicate to patient care and improve quality of care. 79 The seemingly elegant solution for providers of dropping out of the Medicare program is usually a financially impossible undertaking, as many hospital and nursing home residents are covered by Medicare and the facilities depend on the reimbursements.
80
Problems arise even if the provider settles the FCA claim with the government. Most of the FCA cases against hospitals and nursing homes end in settlement, as the provider may favor a lesser financial burden and a reduced risk settling the claim outside of court.
81 Therefore, the providers are often induced to settle with the government, even when they have a good chance of winning, because their potential liability is so great. The government accedes to settlement because "the FCA only provides leverage for the government to recoup money in its current thrust under health care fraud and abuse initiatives," and with settlement, the government is guaranteed some type of remuneration.
82 Healthcare providers have argued that the power the government has in generating settlements is coercive, stunningly similar to extortion.
83
Apart from the providers paying the government for claims that they might win, the high rate of settlement discourages clarification in the law.
[S]ettlement removes many factual and legal issues from judicial scrutiny, it precludes a provider from arguing a range of issues that are crucial both to the development of FCA jurisprudence and to the underlying regulatory policy . . . [w]hat results . . . is an amorphous collection of quasi-legal guidance with no precedential value, on which the government will happily rely in future enforcement efforts. Another major problem with using the FCA in health care cases is that the standards set out in the NHRA and the Conditions of Participation are at best aspirational, and at worst vague and unrealistic. The standards laid out by the government are "general requirements but are not specific as to the content of those requirements."
85 Even the Aranda court in upholding the use of the FCA against a hospital noted that "[i]t may be easier for a maker of widgets to determine whether its product meets contract specifications than for a hospital to determine whether its services meet 'professionally recognized standards for health care. '" 86 Thus, under the FCA, the government is able to penalize providers with huge sums of money under statutes that are subjective and unclear.
Furthermore, " [t] he mere specter of allowing health care quality issues to form the basis of an FCA prosecution is a federal court's nightmare."
87 That is, if a FCA case reaches court instead of settling, judges will have the duty of determining the proper standards of care, rather than health professionals. Because no concrete guidance nor precedent exists in this area, judges will have free reign in setting standards of health care.
The qui tam provision has its own drawbacks for use in the health care area. With a possibility of gaining up to 30% of the winnings and little discouragement to bring all claims, a relator has the incentive to bring suit against providers, even where there is little evidence or de minimis violations. The FCA attempts to deter such behavior by relators by awarding attorney's fees to the defendant when "the Government does not proceed with the action and the person bringing the action conducts the action . . . [and the] defendant prevails in the action and the court finds that the claim of the person bringing the action was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment."
88 As interpreted by the Ninth Circuit Court, "[a]n action is clearly frivolous when the result is obvious or the appellant's arguments of error are wholly without merit. An action is clearly vexatious or brought primarily for purposes of harassment when the plaintiff pursues the litigation with an improper purpose, such as to annoy or embarrass the defendant." 89 However, this finding is difficult to establish in a suit against 91 Both the DOJ and the Health Care Financing Agency (now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) brought suit against Greenbelt Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (Greenbelt) for violations of the FCA and violations of the NHRA, respectively. The court upheld the uncoordinated attempt by the two federal agencies when it denied injunctive relief from termination from Medicare under the NHRA, even after the nursing home entered into a settlement agreement with the DOJ to pay penalties and improve its quality of care.
92 Though the court found that the imposition of penalties under the NHRA after entering into the consent decree with the DOJ was unfair and against the public interest, the court held that both agencies had a right to sue Greenbelt under the repetitive statutes.
93
A theoretical concern about the use of the FCA in the health care context is that it is being used to punish and deter offenders. 94 However, the FCA is a civil statute. Society uses criminal law, not civil law, to punish and deter conduct. 95 One scholar has argued that [w] hile the criminal law has little reason to fear overdeterrence . . . within its appropriate domain, the same cannot be said of civil laws such as the FCA. The overextension of punitive prohibitions is most troubling when the underlying violation is essentially a regulatory offense, or noncompliance with one of the growing number of regulations promulgated by administrative agencies. Finally, one must look to the original intent of the law. The FCA was written to deter false billings to the federal government during the Civil War. The authors of the statute were concerned with overpaying for artillery and receiving useable supplies for the Union troops. The statute has now been taken out of its original context of straightforward billing and put into the fuzzy realm of quality of care in health care facilities. Since the federal government already has statutes in place to prosecute facilities directly for poor quality of care, such as the NHRA, using an out of place Civil War relic to punish providers seems, at best, duplicative.
APPLYING THE FCA TO PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL RESTRAINT CASES The case against CMMC for restraining Ms. Price up to the moment of her death never generated a formal complaint, nor did it go through any type of litigation procedures. Therefore, its precedential value is non-existent. A court receiving a FCA suit based solely on the alleged overuse of chemical and physical restraints would be writing on practically a blank slate. The major question for a restraints-only suit would involve how a court would merge with or distinguish from the Aranda model.
However, in Aranda, the court did not have to delve deeply into health care standards because the facility's care was glaringly and unreasonably poor. The patients at the facility were under little supervision, which lead to physical and sexual abuse. 97 Since Aranda and NHC Healthcare Corp., which followed Aranda's holding without expansion or distinction, were the first and only cases where a federal court addressed the merits of a quality of care claim under the FCA, the door is wide open for a case in which the court would have to interpret standards of care with respect to restraints.
The major reason for the employment of chemical and physical restraints on patients in hospitals and nursing homes is to promote patient safety and prevent falls.
98 Falls and their related injuries are the reason behind many lawsuits against these providers.
99 Though patients who fall may sue the nursing home or hospital for negligently failing to use proper restraints, the provider must make sure not to over-restrain patients. Therefore, the provider
